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INTRODUCTION

Britney Spear’s court conservatorship has once again brought into public debate the
autonomy of celebrities, often thought of in pop culture as larger than life figures adored by
many. On the surface, Spears is a pop sensation with millions of fans worldwide. Behind the
scenes, she struggled in court against her father for power over her estate and life decisions.
Spear’s wrestle for power against her father is not the first and only example of celebrities or pop
icons who are exploited by those around them, profiting off the commercialization of the icon.
From the 20th - 21st century, technological advancements have provided an avenue for the
elevation of politicians’ status to those of celebrities. The rise of television engendered a focus in
politics on personality rather than policies. Dwight Eisenhower’s presidential campaign
strategies sparked the rise of television advertisements and the incorporation of celebrities on the
campaign trail. Eisenhower provided a model for subsequent presidents such as John F. Kennedy
and Ronald Reagan on how to capitalize on a candidate’s charismatic appeal. The advent of
social media continues to blur the lines between politicians and celebrity icons. For example,
“Uncle” Bernie with his viral mittens at the 2021 Presidential Inauguration is a beloved cultural
icon to many young Progressives and Democrats. Former President Barack Obama’s Twitter
boasts 130.1 million followers, the most of any Twitter account and beating out sensational pop
icons such as Rihanna, Taylor Swift, and Justin Bieber. Former President Donald Trump, a
television star turned politician similar to former President Ronald Reagan and The Terminator
star Arnold Schwarzenegger, also amassed a following of over 88 million on Twitter while
developing a cult of personality around his “America First” rhetoric before he was permanently
banned from the social media platform. In the past decade, the world has seen an increasing trend
in populism and subsequently, the creation of modern personality cults around populist leaders
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such as America’s Donald Trump, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, and
Turkey’s Recep Erdogan just to name a few. Researchers have also noted China’s trend towards
a more personalized political system with Xi Jinping as the leader of a personality cult carefully
manufactured by the Chinese Communist Party. 1
As the line between celebrities and politicians blur and personality cults continue to
manifest around populist leaders, it behooves the public to consider to what extent is the same
power dynamics between celebrities and their controlling exploiters applicable to political
figures, specifically those with large cult-like followings. The thesis examines the cases of three
historic Asian leaders with prominent personality cults – Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi
Minh. To what extent did these cult leaders possess the godlike powers that the cult of
personality literature implies? More specifically, did having a personality cult allow them to
unilaterally dictate national policies? I hypothesize that as the personality cult leader’s image
becomes increasingly deified, the cult leader’s godlike powers, operationalized as decisionmaking powers over national policies, will decrease after reaching a climax point.
1.1

Power, Charisma, and the Cult of Personality
To investigate the research question, it is imperative to operationalize three interrelated

concepts – power, charisma, and cult of personality. In political scientist Robert Dahl’s seminal
work on the concept of power, he states that power can be understood as in relation to people. 2 A
has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.3
Dahl expands on his theory of power by stating that “the base of an actor’s power consists of all
the resources – opportunities, acts, objects, etc. – that he can exploit in order to effect (sic) the

Luwei Luqiu, “The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China,” East Asia 33 (2016): 289-307.
Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 202.
3
Ibid., 202-203.
1
2

3
behavior of another.” 4 The base is passive and must be exploited to alter the behavior of others.
Therefore, one of the bases of a charismatic person’s power is that individual’s charisma, and the
exercising of charm or charisma is a means of altering the behavior of others.5
In response to Dahl, sociologist Talcott Parsons argues that power is not a zero-sum
game, and therefore, should not be thought of as merely securing compliance with a wish
between two parties. He defines power, within the context of a political organization, as a
“generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of
collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on
collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by
negative situational sanctions.”6 In an organization, the effectiveness of the collective is
dependent on the hierarchical ordering of the relative strategic importance of contributions.
Therefore, conditions governing the imposition of contributions impact power comparability.
Furthermore, for power to function, it must be legitimized. This leads Parsons to revise Dahl’s
statement as “the power of A over B is, in its legitimized form, the ‘right’ of A, as a decisionmaking unit involved in collective process, to make decisions which take precedence over those
of B, in the interest of the effectiveness of the collective operation as a whole.” 7 According to
Parsons, the right to use power to assert the priority of one’s decision over another’s is called
authority, and dispositions to noncompliance of the higher authority figure is the result of the
incomplete institutionalize of power of the higher authority holder. 8

4

Ibid., 203.
Ibid., 203.
6
Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Political Power,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107, no.
3 (1963): 237.
7
Ibid., 243.
8
Ibid., 243.
5
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In Max Weber’s 1919 speech, he introduces the idea of charisma or the “personal gift of
grace”9 as a form of legitimation of a leader’s authority. He argues that the modern party elects
the demagogic leader, expecting the leader’s personality to increase votes and mandates, and
thereby power and more opportunities for the party and its followers. Therefore, the party’s
power relies on the leader’s personalistic appeal. The basis of the charismatic or personalistic
leader’s claim to legitimacy lies in the masses’ recognition that it is the duty of the charismatic
leader to recognize his special virtues and act properly. The masses’ recognition may manifest
itself as complete personal devotion that arises out of enthusiasm, despair, or hope. 10 However,
Weber notes that the party machine, or the whole apparatus of people behind a leader, could be
dominated by party officials who plays a more direct role in the day-to-day functions of business.
Despite potential bureaucratic domination, Weber notes that party officials submit to a leader’s
personality if it has a strong demagogic appeal, or “the firm belief of the masses in the ethical
substance of his policy, and, above all, their belief in the ethical character of his personality.” 11 A
demagogic leader can dominate the political organization as long as he maintains the masses’
recognition of his charisma, or extraordinary qualities.
Weber’s ideas on the pure type of charismatic leadership is further expanded in his book,
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. “The term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a
certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men
and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional

Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Originally a speech at Munich University 1918, from H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (Translated and edited), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1946), 79.
10
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 359.
11
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Originally a speech at Munich University 1918, from H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (Translated and edited), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1946), 106.
9
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powers or qualities. These are such as not accessible to the ordinary person but are regarded as of
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a
leader.”12 The reference to “supernatural,” “superhuman,” and “divine origin” implies religious
associations with charisma as the basis for godlike or divine powers. However, the Weberian
charismatic leader does not have to be a good leader, in the moral sense, as Weber claims that,
“Charismatic leadership has emerged in all places and in all historical epochs…the magician and
the prophet on the one hand, and in the elected war lord, the gang leader and condotierre on the
other hand.”13
To Weber, charisma is a revolutionary force that is born out of suffering, conflicts, or
enthusiasm. Charismatic leadership does not exist in a system of formal rules or legal principles.
In the pure type of charismatic leadership, the leader is depicted as having godlike powers. He is
unbound by neither judicial precedent nor administrative organs and dictates divine judgements
and revelations.14 However, charismatic authority is unstable since the charismatic leader must
continue to reinforce the masses’ recognition of his charisma through demonstrations of his
charismatic powers. Therefore, charismatic authority must be either traditionalized, rationalized,
or a combination of both. Weber points to two underlying motives for this routinization of
charisma: (1) for the interests of followers by continuously reactivating the community (2) for
the interests of the administrative staff to stabilize and consolidate their authority, social prestige,
economic advantages, and the continuation of the administration. 15

12

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 358-359.
13
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Originally a speech at Munich University 1918, from H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (Translated and edited), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1946), 80.
14
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 361.
15
Ibid., 364.
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American political scientist Robert Tucker expands on Weber’s theory of charismatic
leadership in his analysis of Vladimir Lenin’s personal authority over the Bolshevik
revolutionary movement. Tucker criticizes Weber’s theory as incomplete, noting that it does not
clearly clarify which leaders are charismatic and what makes them charismatic. 16 According to
Tucker, the extraordinary qualities through which a leader may acquire perceived charisma, or
recognition, from followers is possessing the extraordinary powers of vision and persuasion in
political discourse, having a sense of mission or believing in themselves that they were the leader
chosen to head the movement, maintaining the public image of self-confidence and faith in the
movement despite failures, and using rhetoric that taps into followers’ distress while framing the
leader or movement as the solution.17 Weber’s characterization of charisma as a revolutionary
force leads Tucker to specify that the charismatic leader is one who can summon people to join a
charismatic movement for change and lead such a movement. 18 The charismatic movement starts
with a group of people who surrounds the charismatic leader and accepts his authority. The ring
of followers surrounding the charismatic leader declines and grows until it reaches the status of a
movement, organizes, and attains political power.
Why is it that charismatic leadership typically emerges in the context of movements for
change, and why do followers accept the charismatic leader’s authority? Tucker reasons that
followers are distressed, and the charismatic leader is “one in whom, by virtue of unusual
personal qualities, the promise or hope of salvation – deliverance from distress – appears to be
embodied. He is in essence a savior, or one who is so perceived by his followers.” 19 The source
of distress varies from physical to emotional such as persecution, natural catastrophes, extreme

Robert Tucker, “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” Daedalus 97, no. 3 (1968): 732.
Ibid., 736.
18
Ibid., 737.
19
Ibid., 742-743.
16
17
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economic hardship, or feelings of oppression in colonized peoples. 20 Erik Erikson identifies three
forms of distress that make people “charisma-hungry” – fear, anxiety, and existential dread. 21 For
example, a small-scale but vigorous charismatic movement may come from an oppressed racial
or ethnic minority in a society with relatively low general levels of distress or if there is mass
distress, a larger charismatic movement may evolve such as in the context of war. The unique
personal authority of the charismatic leader and the people’s recognition of the leader’s
movement as embodying salvation leads to the development of a spontaneous cult of personality,
or what Tucker describes as a symptom of the charismatic leader-follower relationship. 22
The term ‘cult of personality,’ or ‘cult of individuality,’ is frequently attributed to Nikita
Khrushchev in his 1956 speech denouncing the cult of the individual and Stalinism as in tension
with Marxist ideology.23 However, the Russian terminology for cult of individuality, ‘Kul’t
lichnosti,’ had already appeared earlier in 1953 when it was utilized by Stalin’s successor,
Georgi Malenkov, in his reference to Stalin. 24 The exact definition of a cult of personality varies
according to historical eras and academic discipline. Though the origin of the concept is subject
to historical debates, philosophers and academics have laid the theoretical foundations for
identifying key characteristics of a personality cult. To operationalize the concept of the cult of
personality, the scope of this thesis focuses on the modern cult of personality during the
twentieth century.

20

Ibid., 744.
Ibid., 745.
22
Ibid., 747.
23
"Khrushchev's Secret Speech, 'On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,' Delivered at the Twentieth Party
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," February 25, 1956, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive, From the Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 84th Congress, 2nd Session (May
22, 1956-June 11, 1956), C11, Part 7 (June 4, 1956), pp. 9389-9403,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995.
24
Anita Pisch, “The Phenomenon of the Personality Cult – A Historical Perspective,” in The Personality Cult of
Stalin in Soviet Posters: Archetypes, Inventions, and Fabrications (Australia: ANU Press, 2016): 52.
21
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The cult of personality is not a monolithic concept consisting of an authoritative leader
and devoted followers. It is a phenomenon characterized by the existence of multiple traits.
Political scientist Jeremy Paltiel’s comparative research of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) under Joseph Stalin and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Mao
Zedong defines the cult of personality as the result of a personalistic leader who mobilizes
political combat to establish authority against the party’s institutionalized authority and
eventually becomes “the fountainhead of authority for an entire political system.”25 Political
scientist Pao Min Chang defines the cult of personality as “the artificial elevation of the status
and authority of one man…through the deliberate creation, projection and propagation of a
godlike image.”26 Anita Pisch describes key features of a cult of personality to include elevation
and glorification of an individual, a manufactured image of the cult’s object, the use of mass
media, and parallels to religion. 27 However, all the aforementioned top-down definitions tend to
ignore the agency of the cult followers in the creation of the cult.
Xin Lu and Elena Soboleva’s comparative study of contemporary cults of personality in
Russia and China provides a more systematic definition of the personality cult. According to Lu
and Soboleva, there are four aspects of a cult of personality: (1) existence of cult followers, (2) a
leader that represents a certain ideology or mission whose followers must believe is the solution
to their difficulties, (3) institutionalization to sustain itself, and (4) existence within a
patrimonialism form of governance. 28 Lu and Soboleva, citing Michel Foucault’s metaphor of
power relations, argued that the cult of personality is not something one individual can ‘possess’
Jeremy Paltiel, “The Cult of Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist
Regimes,” Studied in Comparative Communism 16, no. 1 (1983): 50.
26
Pao-min Chang, translated and quoted by Jeremy Taylor from Pao-min Chang, “The Phenomenon of Power:
Some Random Thoughts,” Zhongshan Xueshu Lunncong (Chungshan Academic Writings), no. 18 (2000): 141.
27
Pisch, 54.
28
Xin Lu and Elena Soboleva, “Personality Cults in Modern Politics: Cases from Russia and China,” CGP Working
Paper Series (2014): 4-8.
25
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or ‘utilize’ since the personality cult’s power flows bilaterally from a leader-to-follower and
follower-to-leader relationship. In other words, a leader who displays charisma may form a
following, and the follower’s perceptions of the leader’s charisma, or what Weber calls as
recognition, creates devotion.
A personality cult is established through multiple means. According to historian Frank
Dikötter, “There were hagiographers, photographers, playwrights, composers, poets, editors, and
choreographers. There were powerful ministers of propaganda, and sometimes entire branches of
industry. But the ultimate responsibility lay with the dictators themselves.” 29 Dictators reveal
what they want followers to know, by carefully crafting and cultivating an image worthy of
reverence and idolization. According to Lu and Soboleva, after a cult has been formed, it must be
institutionalized to ensure the object of the cult’s survival. Their idea reflects Weber’s theory of
routinization of charisma. 30 Per Lu and Soboleva, to institutionalize the cult is to inject it into
every aspect of the state from economics to civil society to politics so that the cult is repeatedly
affirmed and psychologically persistent in the followers’ minds. Examples of institutionalization
include implementing a system of succession after the passing of the cult’s object, dispersing the
mythical aspects of the cult’s object, and establishing a structured routinized reiteration of
devotion to the cult’s object and his mission. 31 Historically, the establishment of a cult of
personality heavily involved institutions involved in communications such as the media and/or
the state propaganda apparatus.

29

Frank Dikötter, How to be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century (London, UK,
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019): xii.
30
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 363-373.
31
Xin Lu and Elena Soboleva, 6; Arif Dirlik, “Mao Zedong: Charismatic Leadership and the Contradictions of
Socialist Revolution,” in Charismatic Leadership and Social Movements: The Revolutionary Power of Ordinary
Men and Women, ed. Jan Willem Stutje (New York: Berghahn Books, Inc., 2012), 119.
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The academic literature on the personality cult focuses largely on personality cults of
nondemocratic leaders and portrays the purpose of the personality cult as a power enhancing tool
for the leader and his movement. The personality cult helps to consolidate power and/or to
enhance the image of legitimate authority; thereby, ensuring the endurance of the object of the
cult and the regime’s survival. 32 Dikötter argues that the purpose of the cult is to sow confusion,
isolate individuals, and enforce obedience through self-censorship.33 Paltiel argues that the cult
of personality is brought about by a leader seeking to consolidate power in a fracturing political
party.34 Hannah Arendt theorizes that the leader of a totalitarian regime is all-powerful figure
whose role is to unite the totalitarian system and assume blanket responsibility for actions
performed by underlings on behalf of the regime. The leader is irreplaceable by the movement or
party, but “he is needed, not as a person but as a function, and such he is indispensable to the
movement.”35
Arendt’s depiction of the all-powerful totalitarian leader as a function rather than a
person seemingly strips away the leader’s agency and begs the main research question of this
thesis. To what extent do leaders with personality cults possess the godlike powers that the cult
of personality literature implies? Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh came to power
during revolutionary periods of their respective nations and during the context of war, a great
societal distress. According to the cult of personality literature, large-scale war that creates
general distress in society coupled with revolutionary fervor produces a ripe environment for

Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” (speech, Munich University, 1918); Jeremy Paltiel, “The Cult of
Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist Regimes,” Studied in Comparative
Communism 16, no. 1 (1983): 49-64; Luwei Luqiu, “The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China,” East
Asia 33 (2016): 291; Dikötter, Frank. Dictators: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2020.
33
Dikötter, xiii.
34
Paltiel, 50.
35
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1968), 374.
32
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charismatic leaders to form a large movement for change with “charisma-hungry” followers
devoted to the leader’s mission; thereby, granting the charismatic leader godlike powers over the
party movement. If the cult leader possesses the godlike powers stemming from followers’
reverence as depicted by the extant literature, then one can assume that he has unilateral power
of over the party and national policy decisions. However, a cursory review of the long periods of
rule under of Kim, Mao, and Ho revealed inklings of internal struggles by these supposedly allpowerful leaders against fellow party rivals over the direction of national policies. Given this
possible power struggle, to what extent does the personality cult in fact provide charismatic
leaders with godlike powers? More specifically, to what extent does the personality cult allow its
object to express these godlike powers in the form of unilaterally dictating national policies?
I hypothesize that as the personality cult leader’s public image becomes increasingly
deified, the cult leader’s godlike powers, operationalized as decision-making powers over
national policies, will decrease after reaching a climax point. In examining Kim, Mao, and Ho’s
personality cults, I explore the interrelated factors of war, foreign actors, political ideology, and
agency.
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METHODOLOGY

The thesis utilizes Parson’s definition of power and the Lu and Soboleva definition of
cult of personality as previously defined. 36 Additionally, the elevation and glorification of the
leader in a quasi-religious manner is added as a characteristic of the cult of personality given its
prominent appearance in the modern personality cults. The research design is focused on theory
testing by performing a comparative cross-national multi-case study of the personality cults of
Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh during the 20th century. The thesis aims to reexamine the theoretical utility of the cult of personality as a strategic power enhancing tool.
The thesis attempts to broaden the field of political science’s understanding of how
personality cults operate in the context of Asian revolutionary regimes. The cases of Kim, Mao,
and Ho were chosen because of their similarities. These leaders came to power in the 20th
century when their nations were experiencing revolutionary fervor. The three men were able to
amass a devoted following and have been the object of a personality cult even into the 21 st
century. Though the thesis examines the cases of Kim and Mao, it mainly focuses on the
evolution of Ho’s cult of personality because there has been relatively less contribution in the
cult of personality literature on Ho in comparison to Kim and Mao.
The methodology makes use of some primary sources but is primarily reliant on literature
review considering the inaccessibility of archives during the COVID-19 pandemic. I utilize
translated writings from the Wilson Center Digital Archive and Marxists Internet Archive. I draw
from a diverse array of sources including extant academic literature, meeting memos, and
biographies to describe the extent in which the cult of personality influenced each men’s power

36

(1) existence of cult followers, (2) a leader that represents a certain ideology or mission whose followers must
believe is the solution to their difficulties, (3) institutionalization to sustain itself, and (4) existence within a
patrimonialism form of governance.
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to dictate national policies. I rely heavily on Dikötter’s book as a starting point for exploring the
formation of each men’s cult of personality. For the case of Kim Il Sung, I rely on John Cha and
K.J. Sohn’s book Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il which includes testimonies from North Korean
defector Hwang Jang Yop who was the general secretariat of the Worker’s Party of North Korea
until his defection to South Korea in 1997. I also consult Dae-Sook Suh’s Kim Il Sung: The
North Korean Leader, Andrei Lankov’s From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North
Korea, 1945 – 1960, Bradley Martin’s Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North
Korea and the Kim Dynasty, and relevant academic journals.
For the case of Mao Zedong, I rely heavily on the Wilson Center Digital Archive and the
Marxists Internet Archive for translated conversations and speeches of Mao and other firstgeneration revolutionaries of the Chinese Communist Party. I also rely on translated books such
as The Private Life of Chairman Mao by Mao’s personal physician Dr. Li Zhisui, Yan Jiaqi and
Gao Gao’s Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution, and Geremie Barme’s
Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader.
For the case of Ho, I rely on Olga Dror’s article, “Establishing Ho Chi Minh Cult:
Vietnamese Traditions and Their Transformations,” as well as a number of books including
William Duiker’s Ho Chi Minh, David Halberstam’s Ho, Pierre Brocheaux’s Ho Chi Minh: A
Biography, William Warbey’s Ho Chi Minh and the Struggle for an Independent Vietnam, and
Lien-Hang Nguyen’s Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam. It
has been rumored by experts on Vietnamese history that Ho Chi Minh published two
autobiographies, Vừa đi đường vừa kể chuyện (Walking and Talking) and Những mẩu chuyện về
đời hoạt động của Hồ Chủ Tịch (Vignettes/Glimpses of President Ho’s Life and Activities) under
the pseudonyms T. Lan and Tran Dan Tien, respectively. I was not able to access Vignettes nor

14
find a translated version of Walking and Talking. My biggest regret is not having the language
skills to access the broad untranslated books, articles, and other various works written by and/or
on these men.
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KIM IL SUNG

The case of Kim Il Sung contributes a critical insight into the cult of personality. The
personality cult can be created and manipulated by others close to the cult’s object for their
personal benefits. This portion of the thesis examines the creation of Kim Il Sung’s cult of
personality and focuses not only on the role of Kim Il Sung in building his cult but also the roles
of foreign actors and the consequences of a succession rivalry between his family members,
namely his son Kim Jong Il and his younger brother Kim Yong Ju. In the context of a distressing
civil war and with the political backing of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Kim
Il Sung was able to seize political power. He became a ruthless dictator, consolidating political
power through constant purges and set the stage for the subsequent development of his cult of
personality. As the elder Kim grew older, the issue of succession arose. The two younger Kims
had the same goal of succeeding the elder Kim, and therefore, attempted to outcompete each
other in flattering Kim Il Sung through excessive idolization and elevation of the status of the
Kim Il Sung from a man to a god.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, has lived under
the dynastic rule of the Kim family ever since Kim Il Sung was imposed on the people by the
Soviet Union in 1945.37 Kim sought to penetrate every aspect of society. According to Dikötter,
“Kim was ubiquitous. He was a restless, energetic leader, who concerned himself
with every detail. There were inspections of schools, tours of cooperatives, visits
to factories, even impromptu appearances at local meetings that he would chair,
all of them reported in minute detail with numerous photographs in the
newspapers.”38
Even before Kim became the ‘Suryong,’ or Great Leader, numerous writers contributed
to engineering his heroic image. They extolled his great leadership and his mythical
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revolutionary past against the Japanese invaders. 39 Through the media and with the power
bestowed upon him by Stalin, Kim began to cultivate his image as a brave and modest leader
whom the people could rally behind.
During his reign over the DPRK, Kim implemented patrimonialism as the form of
governance through constantly purging military and political institutions and replacing
experienced officials with loyal supporters and his family members. 40 The context of the chaotic
and tumultuous Korean War allowed Kim to carry out constant purges of rival party factions by
accusing them of being disloyal to the party or responsible for the disastrous impacts of the war.
Kim’s constant purges of the party reflects Paltiel’s theory of a cult of personality that is formed
as result of political combat wielded against party rivals to consolidate power. As the Korean
War (1950 – 1953) ravaged the country, Kim moved to establish his authority within the factious
Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) which was made up of four factions: the Domestic, the Yanan,
the Guerrilla (which includes the Kapsan faction), and the Soviet. In 1950, Kim purged Mu
Chong, the Yanan’s top military general, by accusing him of military insubordination and being
responsible for the loss of Pyongyang during the Korean War. It is also speculated that Kim
purged Mu Chong for fear that Mu’s Chinese connections could have strengthened his place in
the party after the intervention of the Chinese military in the Korean War. 41
In 1951, Kim and Ho Kai, Number Two within the party and leader of the Soviet
Koreans, were in tension on how to deal with possible members who were not loyal to the
party.42 Kim ultimately accused Ho Kai of excessive party purges and expelled him from the
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party and re-instated those who were purged by Ho-Kai. According to Dikötter, those re-instated
embraced Kim as their savior. 43 Meanwhile, the Soviet Koreans’ leadership suffered a
devastating blow with the expulsion of Ho-Kai and Kim was one step closer to consolidating
power. By the 1950s, Kim had created a base of loyal followers within the party.
After Khrushchev launched his de-Stalinization campaign, Kim distanced himself from
the Soviet Union. He implemented Hwang Jang Yop’s idea of ‘juche,’ or self-reliance ideology
despite still taking foreign assistance from the USSR and PRC. Juche ideology, still espoused in
modern-day North Korea under Kim Jong Un, represents the solution to the economic difficulties
of Kim Il Sung followers’.44 Kim positioned himself as the leader whose mission was to alleviate
his followers’ distress. In 1956, Ri Sang-Jo, DPRK Ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote to
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and the Central Committee of the
Korean Worker’s Party in rebuke of Kim’s purges and decisions made at the Korean Worker’s
Party 3rd Congress. Ri’s letter provides evidence for that claim that by the 1950s, Kim was
engendering a cult of personality through political combat. Ri wrote,
“All those comrades who, guided by Leninist organizational principles, expressed
principled criticism of the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung, who harmed our
party, were classed as ‘anti-party factionalists’ trying to overthrow the
government and the leadership of the party…The ‘leading’ comrades managed to
expel from the ranks of the party honest Communists who had courageously and
openly spoken against the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung, through deception
and threats against Central Committee members.” 45
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Moreover, Kim’s cult of personality became increasingly institutionalized through routinized
reiteration of devotion to his cult. For example, the Sinuiju Pulp Factory held daily meetings on
Kim’s teachings.46 According to Ri,
“If one analyzes newspaper and magazine materials, school textbooks, fictional
literature, and works of art, then we easily see the cult of personality here, there,
and everywhere, that is, the name of Kim Il Sung is raised higher than the names
of kings in bourgeois countries. The name of Kim Il Sung is celebrated in many
songs…And as if this weren’t enough, the young Kim Il Sung is called the father
of Korean youth.”47
According to historian and expert on North Korea, Andrei Lankov, “By the early 1960s
Kim Il Sung had become not only supreme, but also the omnipotent ruler of North Korea – no
longer merely ‘first among equals,’ as had been the case in the late 1940s.” 48
However, by the mid-1960s, Kim had not yet possessed godlike powers. The Kapsan
faction sought to challenge Kim’s increasing authority. The struggle between the Kapsan faction
and Kim focused on ideological challenges about how to handle the country’s economy and who
should succeed the elder Kim. Kim Il Sung positioned his brother Kim Yong Ju as his successor;
however, the Kapsan faction which had the support of filmmakers favored Pak Kum Chol who
desired a more liberal approach to the economy. Kim purged the Kapsan faction in 1967 after
acquiring enough support from fellow party members.49 Following the Kapsan faction incident,
Kim Yong Ju wrote the Ten Principles for the Monolithic Ideological System, regulations over
the everyday lives of North Koreans that dictated a leader-worshiper relationship, to reinforce the
monolithic system as a means of flattering his older brother and ensuring his position as
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successor. Ten Principles marked the beginning of Kim’s one-man rule.50 Kim Jong Il, who had
a known love for movies, was promoted to cultural arts director of the Information Department
and oversaw the publishing department to clean up what Kim Il Sung saw as anti-party elements
in film arts.51 This was Kim Jong Il’s way into the party mechanisms in order to compete against
his uncle for succession. According to Bradley Martin,
“As enforcer of what the regime called its ‘monolithic’ or ‘unitary’ system, Kim
Jong Il during the ‘60s and ‘70s presided over the shift to describing the state
dogma as ‘Kimilsungism.’ The term, with its specific connotation of one-man
rule, was credited to the junior Kim himself. While the elder Kim…increased
tensions with the United States, his son set out to intensify the personality cult.
Kim Jong Il…was convinced of the need to defend Kim Il Sung’s absolute
authority and his revolutionary ideas ‘in order to tide over this difficult situation.’
It was during that period that the senior Kim made the transition from mere
dictator to official deity.”52
The competition between Kim Jong Il and his uncle, Kim Yong Ju, to succeed Kim Il
Sung warped Kim Il Sung’s image from a “partisan freedom fighter against the Japanese
imperialism” to “a conquering hero, as if he and his shabby, hungry band of commandos had
demolished the mighty Japanese military machine all by themselves. He [Kim Il Sung] emerged
bigger than life, made possible by Kim Jong Il and his blind ambition to succeed power.” 53 Kim
Jong Il became chief of the Information Department within two years. He founded a cinematic
writers’ group which would go on to produce revolutionary movies such as Pibada and Flower
Salesgirl which contributed to the idolization of Kim Il Sung.54 As the state implemented and
reinforced the monolithic system, books on other ideologies were burned and replaced with ones
that espoused praise upon the elder Kim. During the time in which Kim Jong Il was embedded in
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the Information Department and publishing department, books with phrases like “Kim Il Sung
the Illuminator”, “the Sun,” “the Oracle,” “the Omniscient,” “the Divine,” “Deity,” and “The
King of Light” appeared.55 “Kim Jong Il’s strategy for building his father’s personality cult was
simple: keep the people in the dark and feed them your brand of goods. He isolated all
communication channels and kept feeding them heroic deeds that Kim Il Sung supposedly
accomplished.”56 In 1969, he was appointed deputy chief of Party Organizational Department,
directly under his uncle. The young Kim capitalized on his uncle’s declining health to staff both
the Information Department and the Party Organizational Department with loyal friends and
family members. Kim Jong Il built research institutes for his mother, father, and himself in his
mission to institutionalize the family cult. 57 In 1973, Kim Jong Il renamed the Research Center
for Korean Worker’s Party History to the Research Center for Comrade Kim Il Sung’s
Revolutionary History.58
Kim Jong Il manipulated the cult of Kim Il Sung, elevating it to that of an all-powerful
omniscient god for his personal gains. He needed to outdo his uncle in pleasing his father while
simultaneously setting the stage for his reign as the next charismatic leader. Despite possessing
the personality cult of a god, Kim Il Sung still did not have godlike powers over national
policies. Kim Il Sung, the man, became Kim Il Sung, the god, but without godlike powers. Kim
Il Sung’s political powers over the management of the nation slowly faded during the 1960s until
his death in 1994 as his younger son became increasingly embedded in the innerworkings and
decision-making of the party. In February 1974, Kim Jong Il’s machinations to succeed his father
proved fruitful. Kim Il Sung tapped his son, Kim Jong Il as his successor and officially
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eliminated the greatest threat to his now omniscient personality cult and regime’s survival –
succession – by institutionalizing a dynastic form of succession.59 Kim Jong Il reworked his
uncle’s Ten Principles, distributed it across the country, and instructed people to memorize the
new doctrine of Kim Il Sung which included statements such as “For our Great Leader Kim Ilsung, we must bestow upon him absolute authority. It is prerequisite for our revolution and the
revolutionary will of our Party and the people” and “We must firmly establish order for the
Party, State, and Military so that they can consistently function as a single unit under the
leadership of our Great Leader Kim Il-sung. Establishing the sole, unique leadership structure of
our Great Leader Kim Il-sung is a basic requirement in strengthening the Party structure
ideologically and for enhancing the Party’s capability in its leadership role, as well as a
guarantee for the victory in our revolution and construction of the State.” 60
By 1980, it was clear that Kim Jong Il was in control of the state with his father
becoming a figurehead. Government reporting structures changed as underlings reported matters
of foreign affairs or the national economy to Kim Jong Il who would even send false reports to
his father. Hwang Jang Yop wrote:
“Kim Jong-il ignored financial concerns as he drove hard for the completion of
his projects, wasting tremendous financial resources and manpower. He ignored
fundamental economic principles and invited national economic disaster…As a
result, the coal-mining industry came dangerously close to shutting down.
Nonetheless, Kim Jong-il gave Kim Il-sung glowing reports.”61
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On the role of agency, as the elder Kim’s health declined, he performed less on-site visits
across the country, leaving him with less control over national policies. For example, Kim Il
Sung rejected a co-educational system, believing boys and girls should be separated. A decade
later, Kim Jong Il ordered the education committee to implement a co-educational system which
left committee members fearful about Kim Il Sung’s reactions. These committee members
decided not to mention the change in policies to the elder Kim who never found out about North
Korea’s new co-educational system.62 The elder Kim also he received fewer reports from his son
who expressed concerns about his failing eyes.
Kim Il Sung’s political maneuvers to consolidate power within the Worker’s Party of
Korea set the stage for his son, Kim Jong Il, to institutionalize of the elder Kim’s cult of
personality through the manipulation of the media and arts. Party conflicts due to conflicting
political ideologies resulted in constant purges that consolidated Kim Il Sung’s dictatorship. The
context of war and revolution allowed for Kim Jong Il to turn the cult of Kim Il Sung the man to
Kim Il Sung the god while also manufacturing the cult of the Kim dynasty to legitimize his
succession and authority. The young Kim gradually took over national decision-making powers
from his aging father as the cult of the Kim dynasty penetrated every aspect of the state and
society. Why was Kim Jong Il able to manipulate his father’s cult of personality for his personal
benefits? Perhaps it was because the elder Kim increasingly trusted his son – the one who had
raised statues of him and produced films and books proclaiming his greatness. Perhaps his old
age finally slowed the dictator and forced him to take a step back in decision-making. Perhaps
his declining influence was the result of the party structure which placed Kim Jong Il in between
his father and the party on the chain of command. The rise of Kim Jong Il was likely a result of
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an interplay between all three factors. The case of Kim Il Sung reveals that despite having a
personality cult of a god, the charismatic leader does not necessarily have godlike powers. The
cult of personality may be manipulated by associates close to the cult leader for their personal
gains, similar to the relationship dynamic between celebrities and their controlling managers who
profit from the characterization of the celebrity. Towards the end of his life, Kim Il Sung
reigned, but he did not rule.

24
4

MAO ZEDONG

This section of the thesis explains the establishment of the cult of Mao and reveals that
Mao’s cult of personality did not grant him godlike powers in the form of unilateral decisionmaking powers over national policies. Though Mao was the center of a cult of personality in
China, he was forced to share its power with first-generation revolutionaries such as Liu Shaoqi,
Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and other members of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).63 Mao constantly wrestled against other first-generation revolutionaries to dictate the
country’s direction. Even as Mao tried to harness the political power stemming from his
charismatic movement by calling on the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, Mao would
resign to the reality that he also did not have the power to fully control his charismatic
movement.
Mao became involved in the CCP as a peasant guerilla fighter. Through unorthodox
guerilla tactics, Mao was able to claim a region of land in the Jiangxi Province and declared it a
Soviet Republic, financially backed by Moscow, in 1931.64 However, Chinese Central
Committee, being critical of Mao’s guerrilla tactics, displaced Mao as head of the region and
installed Zhou Enlai, an educated man, who previously described Mao’s troops as “just bandits
who roam here and there.”65 These so-called ‘bandits’ were Mao’s followers and would
contribute to the subsequent development of Mao’s cult of personality.
Foreign actors played a major role in engendering the cult of Mao. Mao’s military
success after the Long March and Stalin’s geopolitical strategies during the Cold War elevated
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Mao’s authority within the ranks of the CCP. The Communist International (Comintern), an
international association of national communist parties that was controlled by the USSR, began
praising Mao as China’s great leader. Mao commissioned a young American reporter to
document his military successes in what would become a sensational book of international
proportions. Red Star over China, the product of Mao’s careful cultivation of his image, was
filled with Mao’s mythical past to further elevate his status and turn him into the symbolic leader
of the CCP to the outside world.66
From the late 1930s to mid-1940s, Mao established himself as a wise military leader and
theoretician with the help of others. His personal physician noted that Mao had “an almost
mystical faith in the role of the leader. He never doubted that his leadership, and only his
leadership, would save and transform China. He was China’s Stalin.” 67 In 1943, Mao Zedong
Thought, a term coined by Wang Jiaxiang, became compulsory and Mao began to rewrite
Chinese history, evident through his report on the history of the party which placed Mao’s Long
March at the center. 68 Meanwhile, the CCP reorganized Chinese society, classifying its
population into groups based on their loyalties to the revolution. A patrimonialism form of
government was established as one’s access to food, education, marriage, and healthcare
depended on one’s class label, or ‘chengfen.’ 69 The party penetrated civil society and eliminated
organizations outside the scope of the party.
However, the development of Mao’s cult of personality faced a monumental challenge
after Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech denounced the cult of personality and called for deStalinization. Mao rightly saw Khrushchev’s speech as a threat to his authority as China’s
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supreme leader. At the Eight Party Congress in 1956, Liu Shaoqi cited the Soviet Union’s
denouncement of the cult of the individual.
“The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held last
February, was an important political event of world significance. It not only drew
up the Sixth Five-Year Plan of gigantic proportions, decided on many important
policies and principles for further development of the cause of socialism and
repudiated the cult of the individual which had had grave consequences inside the
Party.”70
According to Dikötter, Mao seethed at Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for “taking control
of the agenda and relegating him to the background.” 71 The reports delivered at the Eight Party
Congress lauded collectivized leadership and decried the cult of personality. Mao complained to
his doctor. “I am going to resign the chairmanship of the republic…but I am still the chairman of
the party. Why didn’t they consult me about the party congress? They did not give me a chance
to participate in drafting the political report. They did not let me see the text in advance.” 72 By
the mid 1950s, Liu and Mao’s ideological differences were becoming clearer. Liu believed that
China would undergo a certain degree of capitalism growth whereas Mao called Liu “a capitalistroader who wielded power” and a “Khrushchev type who is sleeping next to us.” 73 Mao’s
personal physician observed that Liu and Deng’s views of the party differed fundamentally from
Mao’s. The two men viewed the party as a decision-making organ, making Mao and them first
amongst equals. However, Mao viewed himself as China’s supreme leader.
After Khrushchev announced the Soviet Union’s plan to catch up economically to the
United States, Mao devised the Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1961) in an attempt to outstrip
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British steel production and upstage Khrushchev. The Great Leap Forward was a disaster to
China’ economy and brought about widespread national famine. In 1959 at the Lushan
Conference, Peng Dehua tried to warn Mao of the corruption and economic fallout that could
ensure from the Great leap Forward, but was subsequently denounced as a party of a rightopportunist anti-party clique.74 An estimated number of deaths related to the famine range from
23 to 55 million.75 Mao was forced to the second-front of decision-making as other firstgeneration revolutionaries like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping tried to amend China’s economy
while still utilizing the cult of Mao as a symbol of national unity and state authority.
Evidence of Mao expressing a sense of powerlessness over national matters despite
possessing a cult of personality is seen during a conversation between the Chairman and other
members of the Chinese Community Party.
“Comrade T’ao Chu said: ‘Supreme power has slipped from your hands.’
The Chairman said: ‘This is because I deliberately relinquished it. Now, however,
they have set up independent kingdoms; there are many things I have not been
consulted about, such as the land problem, the Tientsin speeches, the cooperatives
in Shansi…All these things should really have been discussed at the Centre before
decisions were taken. Teng Hsiao-p’ing never came to consult me: from 1959 to
the present he has never consulted me over anything at all…It’s not so bad that I
am not allowed to complete my work, but I don’t like being treated as a dead
ancestor.’”76
Through his charisma, Mao was able to regain political power over the party leadership
by mobilizing the Red Guards, a student-led social movement which united under Mao Zedong
Thought. The Red Guards were formed in 1966 when middle-school students in support of Mao
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Zedong Thought gathered to criticize the play Hai Rui Dismissed and their school administrators.
The Red Guards’ oath was:
“We are the guards of red power. Chairman Mao of the Party Central is our
mountain of support. Liberation of all mankind is our righteous responsibility;
Mao Zedong Thought is the highest guiding principle for all our actions. We
swear to protect the Party Central and to protect our great leader Chairman Mao.
We resolutely will shed our last drop of blood!” 77
Mao understood how to tap into the power of the masses in order to purge the party from
without. He provided political legitimacy to the Red Guards in a letter that expressed his support.
“The two big-character posters which you wrote on 24 June and 4 July express
your anger at, and denunciation of, all landlords, bourgeois, imperialists,
revisionists, and their running dogs who exploit and oppress the workers,
peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary parties and groupings. You
say it is right to rebel against reactionaries; I enthusiastically support you.”78
With Mao’s support, Red Guards movements popped up across the country. A Mass
Meeting Celebrating the Cultural Revolution was schedule for August 18, 1966. Close to a
million representatives of the Red Guards movement gathered at Tiananmen Square to see Mao
Zedong, shouting, “Long Live Chairman Mao!” 79 Mao sidelined Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi,
both of whom he accused as suppressing the student revolution. 80 Mao replaced Liu Shaoqi as
second in command and promoted Lin Biao who had constantly professed praises of the great
Chairman at party congresses. Little did Mao know, Lin was secretly critical of Mao, having
once wrote that the Great Leap Forward was a disaster.81 Lin promoted Mao Zedong Thought
within the armed forces while expanding his own power by promoting loyal followers to key
positions. Lin was able to utilize the cult of Mao for his own gains, but eventually died in a
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mysterious plane crash in 1971. 82 As for Liu, his rank within the CCP fell as the media continued
to promote Mao Zedong Thought in the fervor of the Cultural Revolution.
Mao’s mobilization of the Red Guards helped him to regain political power over the
party. Mao had become the center of a personality cult that revered him as its great leader and
elevated him to the status of a god. However, even as the leader of a large charismatic movement
such as the Red Guard, Mao could not control the Red Guards. The Red Guards, motivated by
Lin Biao, started a Destroy the Four Olds movement which spread across the nation. They
destroyed historical and religious sites and artifacts, replaced Buddhist icons with pictures of
Mao Zedong, renamed street signs and buildings, overthrew provincial party committees, and
accosted artists and writers who were accused of being reactionary academic authorities. They
instilled a Red Terror across the country through inhuman torture practices against those who
opposed them.83 The Red Guards waged violence against the old order, the CCP, and the military
in their attempt to establish a new administration in the PRC. Eventually, the Red Guards spiral
out of Mao’s control. Factions appeared within the Red Guards as they fought over which group
was truer to Mao Zedong Thought. Mao previously had a policy of non-intervention by the army
but on January 21, he called in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to restore order and stability
in provinces with radical groups of Red Guards. Mao wrote in his announcement to the army’s
General Political Department, “The army should extend help wherever they ask for help. The socalled non-interference is false interference. It has long ago become interference. In connection
with this, I ask that a new order be issued and the former one be rescinded.” 84 From the
perspective of Parson’s theory of political power, Mao lost control of the Red Guards movement
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because he did not establish clear guidelines and organizational control over movement; thereby,
never fully institutionalizing his power as the higher authority.
After Mao Zedong died in 1976, the CCP reworked the reverence and idolization of Mao
to fit the needs of the party. Mao was needed not as a person but as a function similar to Arendt’s
depiction of the totalitarian leader. In 1979, Marshal Ye Jianying, a top party official, declared,
“What we call Mao Zedong Thought…is not the product of Mao Zedong’s personal wisdom
alone; it is the product of the wisdom of Mao and his comrades-in-arms…It is the crystallization
of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party.”85 Even though Mao’s cult of
personality, built on terror and some genuine adoration, elevated him to symbolize Chinese
national unity and leadership, it did not grant him ultimate unilateral decision-making powers.
By the end of the 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party came to embrace the cult of Mao,
allowing him to proceed with the Great Leap Forward. When the economic plan proved
disastrous for the Chinese economy and people, Mao was relegated to the side as other firstgeneration revolutionaries implemented economic reform policies to mend the economy. A
powerless Mao utilized his personality cult to mobilize the Red Guards during the Cultural
Revolution to regain power and banish the old party leadership. However, Mao also lost control
over the Red Guards as they destroyed cities and instilled an atmosphere of terror. The case of
Mao reveals how a charismatic leader may lose control over his personality cult and movement.
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5

HO CHI MINH

Ho Chi Minh’s cult of personality is less discussed in the academic literature in
comparison to the cult of Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong. The most notable biographies on Ho
briefly mention his cult of personality but does not specifically focus on the process in which Ho
was deified. How did Ho display his charismatic virtues? How did he obtain recognition from
people and build his charismatic movement? Did the personality cult give him godlike powers to
dictate national policies? Similar to the cults of Kim and Mao, the cult of Ho provides a puzzle to
the field’s understanding of the cult of personality as a strategic power enhancing tool. The
historical literature examined provides support for the hypothesis that Ho, though at the center of
a personality cult which revered him, did not have unilateral decision-making powers. Despite
his status as the nation’s sagacious “Uncle Ho,” he came into conflict with fellow party leaders’
decisions regarding national policies such as land reform and military tactics during the Vietnam
War. The purpose of this portion of the thesis is to explore the complexities of how Ho the man
became Bác Ho or “Uncle Ho” of the nation.
Much of Ho Chi Minh’s (He who Enlightens 86 or Ho the Most Enlightened 87) life before
1941, when he returned to Vietnam after a decade abroad, is uncertain and unknown. Ho lived in
several countries throughout the course of his life, assuming a speculated 50 to 200 pseudonyms
and producing writings in a variety of languages including English, French, Chinese, and
Russian.88 Ho became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s Prime Minister from 1945-1955
and President from 1945 to his death in 1969.89 In this section of the thesis, I describe the
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evolution of Ho’s cult of personality, his rise as a revolutionary leader, his rivalry with younger
party colleagues (namely First Secretary Le Duan), and the institutionalization of Ho’s
personality cult by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) for its benefits.
To understand the creation and evolution of the cult of Ho, it is critical to contextualize
Ho’s early childhood. The official year of Ho’s birth as promulgated by the Vietnamese
government is 1890.90 Ho was born into a time of general societal distress amongst the colonized
peoples of French Indochina due to gross economic disparity, the psychological and emotional
effects of colonization, and civil conflicts. Chapter one of David Halberstam’s Ho provides a
concise description of the brewing anti-French and anti-colonial sentiments during the late 19th
century. Ho Chi Minh, born as Nguyen Sinh Cung in a small village called Kim Lien, took the
name Nguyen Tat Thanh at age 10 in accordance with Vietnamese customs. 91 Ho’s brother,
Khiem, was a militant nationalist. 92 His father, Nguyen Sinh Sac, belonged to a world of
academics and scholars, and had encouraged Ho to study French. 93 Sac was friends with the
nationalist Phan Boi Chau who imparted long lasting advice on the young Ho before being exiled
to China. “Those who wish to liberate the country will have to form a strong party.” 94
5.1

Ho Chi Minh Abroad: The First Signs of Charismatic Virtues and the Beginnings of
A Movement
From 1911 – 1941, Ho Chi Minh vanished from Vietnam, but it was during his time

abroad that he displayed to the international community the virtues of his charismatic leadership
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such as political persuasion skills, possessing a powerful vision, a sense of mission, and the
projection of self-confidence. During his time abroad Ho became entrenched in the ideologies
Marxist-Leninism and rose through the ranks of the Communist International (Comintern). In
France, he adopted the pseudonym Nguyen Ai Quoc (‘Nguyen the Patriot’ or literally, ‘Nguyen
who loves his country’)95 and became involved with the French Left. He displayed his
communication skills by contributing to L'Humanité, Le Populaire, and La Vie Ouvrière, three
left leaning French newspapers. He was the first Annamese member to join the Jeunesses
socialistes (the Young Socialist) movement. 96 During the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919,
Ho, on behalf of the Groupe des Patriotes Annamites (Group of Patriotic Annamites), boldly sent
an eight-point plan for his country’s emancipation to the American Secretary of State Robert
Lansing as well as other attending delegations. 97 The eight-point plan, inspired by American
President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, also appeared in L'Humanité. As the great powers
dictated the new world order after World War I, Ho Chi Minh laid out his vision for French
Indochina and his people in the following translated version of his eight-point plan:
1. General amnesty for all native political prisoners;
2. Reform Indochinese justice by granting the natives the same judicial guarantees as
were enjoyed by the Europeans;
3. Freedom of the press and opinion;
4. Freedom of association;
5. Freedom of emigration and foreign travel;
6. Freedom of instruction and the creation in all provinces of technical and professional
schools for indigenous people;
7. Replacement of rule by decree by rule of law;
8. Election of a permanent Vietnamese delegation to the French Parliament, to keep it
informed of the wishes of the indigenous people. 98
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He increasingly took up the movement for independence of colonized peoples while
establishing a reputation for himself as Nguyen Ai Quoc. Ho’s political activities placed him
under close surveillance by the French police who speculated that Ho had frequent contacts with
other Irish, Chinese, and Korean nationalists who also came to Paris to lobby the great powers. 99
In Bui Lam’s book Souvenirs sur Ho Chi Minh (Recollections of Ho Chi Minh), he wrote:
“At Versailles, where the imperialists were sharing the colonial cake, a
Vietnamese called Nguyen Ai Quoc had made an unheralded demand for selfdetermination in Vietnam. To us, it was like a flash of lightning, the first
thunderclap of spring…Here was a Vietnamese insisting that his people be
accorded their rights. We took our hats off to him. No two Vietnamese residing in
France could meet, after this, without mentioning the name of Nguyen Ai
Quoc.”100
In December 1920, Ho became a founding member of the French Communist Party after
he voted on behalf of the Indochinese Socialist Group and the 13th Section of the Socialist
Revolutionary Federation of the Seine to join Lenin’s Committee for the Third International, also
known as Communist International or Comintern. 101 He eventually published an article in 1960
titled “The Path that Led Me to Leninism” to explain why he decided to join Comintern. Ho’s
formative years abroad clarified his vision for his revolutionary movement.
“At first, patriotism, not yet Communism led me to have confidence in Lenin, in
the Third International. Step by step, along the struggle, by studying MarxismLeninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon
the fact that only Socialism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working
people throughout the world from slavery…Leninism is not only a miraculous
‘book of the wise,’ a compass for us Vietnamese revolutionaries and people: it is
also the radiant sun illuminating our path to final victory, to Socialism and
Communism.”102
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By the early 1920s, Ho founded the League of the Oppressed Asian Peoples, founded and
edited the publication La Paria as an educational and agitation tool for the anti-imperialist
struggle, and became a leading figure of the French Communist Party. 103 In 1923, Ho
clandestinely departed Paris for Moscow where he trained as a revolutionary at the Communist
University of the Toilers of the East, wrote reports on Vietnam for Comintern, and contributed to
Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.104 In Summer of
1924, Ho capitalized on the gathering of international communist leaders at the Fifth Congress of
the Comintern to display his oratorical skills while directing their attention to the plight of
colonized peoples. In one of his speeches, he stated:
“In all the French colonies, famine is on the increase and so is the people’s hatred.
The native peasants are ripe for insurrection. In many colonies, they have risen
many times but their uprisings have all been drowned in blood. If at present the
peasants still have a passive attitude, the reason is that they still lack organization
and leaders. The Communist International must help them to revolution and
liberation.”105
Ho’s speeches at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern marked the beginning of his
international recognition as a charismatic and revolutionary leader. The young, fiery
revolutionary was not shy about scolding international leaders on the plight of the colonized
peoples. In another speech at the Fifth Congress, Ho stated:
“It seems to me that the comrades do not entirely comprehend the fact that the
fate of the world proletariat, and especially the fate of the proletarian class in
aggressive countries that have invaded colonies, is closely tied to the fate of the
oppressed peoples of the colonies.”106
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He was irked by the lack of the Comintern’s actions to liberate colonized peoples,
especially those in French Indochina. His vision of a free and independent Indochina had to be
carried out through his efforts.
In November 1924, Ho was sent by Moscow to Canton to undertake in revolutionary
action. Ho, under the pseudonyms Ly Thuy and Mr. Vuong, began to build Robert Tucker’s idea
of a charismatic movement in Canton, China. Canton was a revolutionary center for Vietnamese
nationalists and exiled rebels. The city was near Vietnam’s northern borders and housed exiled
nationalist Phan Boi Chau who attracted other exiled revolutionaries. The extremist and younger
members of Chau’s revolutionary group became disillusioned by Chau’s lack of ideology and
branched out to form the Tam Tam Xa (Society of Beating Hearts).107 Ho targeted his efforts to
transform the Tam Tam Xa into a new Communist Group based on Marxist-Leninist ideology
under his leadership. He succeeded in 1925 with the founding of the Vietnamese Revolutionary
Youth League (Hoi Viet Nam Cach Mang Thanh Nien or Thanh Nien) with Ho Tung Mau and
Le Hong Phong, two Vietnamese revolutionaries.108 Ho also established the publication Thanh
Nien to disperse the league’s ideas throughout China and French Indochina as a form of
communication propaganda. After establishing Thanh Nien, Ho imparted his followers with
specific tasks such as create party cells in French Indochina or receive military training through
Moscow.
Ho eventually fled from Canton to Moscow to avoid capture by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops
which were arresting known communists in Canton. In 1928, Ho traveled to Siam, utilized the
pseudonym Father Chin, and established a new headquarters for Thanh Nien with the hopes of
expanding Comintern’s networks in Southeast Asia. He traveled throughout Siam in simple
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clothing, establishing local cells and advising members to appeal to the local population as well
radical youths to broaden international support for his planned revolutionary movement. Ho
understood the importance of his image and the image of local Vietnamese in Siam for garnering
international support for Vietnamese nationalist movement. He made himself an example for the
Vietnamese merchants in Siam by learning Thai and participating in physical labor to construct a
local school.109 He brought stories and news of the international revolutionary movement to local
villages and Thanh Nien cells in Siam. He was a simple yet educated and well-traveled man, a
man that people could simultaneously relate to and idolize. He was the charismatic leader.
Meanwhile, without its leader, Thanh Nien fractured into three factions due to ideological
differences – the Communist Party of Annam, Revolutionary Party of the New Vietnam, and
League of Indochinese Communists. Ho was preoccupied with preparing and directing
communist organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Siam as well as communicating with the
French Communist Party, the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, and the AntiImperialist League. He was a prominent figure regarding East Asia affairs and the leaders of the
Comintern knew that Ho could unite the three factions. In February 1930, Ho met the
representatives of each faction in Hong Kong and organized the factions under one party, the
Vietnamese Communist Party (Dan Cong San Vietnam) which was later renamed to the
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) at Comintern’s request. 110 Ho understood how to tap into
people’s anti-colonial sentiments and sense of distress as a rallying call. At the founding of the
Indochinese Communist Party, he declared:
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“The French imperialists’ inhuman oppression and exploitation have helped our
people realize that with revolution we will survive and without revolution we will
die.”111
The ability of Ho to lead and unite the three factions under one party with a common
cause is evidence of his charismatic prowess and influence. By 1930, Ho had a firm grasp on his
charismatic movement. Ho returned to Vietnam in 1941 and established an ICP base at Pac Bo, a
small village near the borders of China and northern Vietnam. From May 10 – 19, 1941, Ho
presided over the eight plenum of the Central Committee of the ICP in Pac Bo.112 During this
time, the League for Vietnamese Independence (Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh or Viet Minh for
short) was established. In 1942, Ho adopted the Chinese name Ho Chi Minh as he crossed over
into China with the goals of meeting Chiang Kai-shek to secure his support for the Viet Minh
against growing Japanese aggression and to reopen communications with the Chinese
Communist Party. Ho was arrested by Chiang’s officers and relocated to different prisons until
his release in 1943. After his release, Ho Chi Minh, financially supported by the United States,
China, and the Soviet Union, organized and led the Viet Minh to drive out Japanese forces. He
proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on September 2, 1945.
5.2

A Moderate in A Revolution
By 1950, the Viet Minh increasingly relied on the Chinese Communist Party for support

in the war against the French. Ho’s power was beginning to wane at the Second Party Congress
in 1951 as Chinese influence grew. The DRV adopted a number of reforms to please their
Chinese benefactors, including land reforms and a cleanse of party leadership. At the Second
Party Congress, Mao Zedong Thought was endorsed in Ho’s political report as one of the pillars
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of the DRV’s ideology.113 Chinese advisers poured into the DRV and sought to instill the Maoist
model of revolution onto the Viet Minh. Ideological differences between communist Chinese
advisors and many nationalist Viet Minh who had little exposure to Marxist-Leninism created a
rift in the Viet Minh as some soldiers deserted the army or committed suicide and many senior to
mid-level officers deemed too nationalist were purged.114
Furthermore, stringent land reforms were encouraged by Chinese advisors to eliminate
the influence of local elites. The DRV’s original land reform program involved confiscating
farmland from French citizens and Vietnamese collaborators of the Bao Dai regime. The land of
patriotic landlords and rich peasants were not seized in the interest of maintaining their support
for the nationalist movement. However, Chinese advisers urged stricter enforcement of rent
reductions by landlords and limitations on the participation of landlords in the villages. Some
party leaders took this as a cue to go against Ho’s initial land reform programs. Notably, General
Secretary Truong Chinh agreed that Ho’s initial program did not serve the interests of the
revolutionary movement. To win over the support of rural poor, Truong Chinh and other
influential party leaders promoted harsher land reform strategies such as seizure of all farmlands
whose landlords were not cooperating in the war effort, public tribunals for landlords who were
accused of oppressing the peasants, and dramatic cuts in land rents.
Land reform became a point of contention again in 1953 as the Viet Minh prepared for
the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Chinese advisers and other more radical party leaders such as
Truong Chinh and Hoang Quoc urged for more stringent land regulations as a means of
mobilizing the poor to increase grain production, destroying the old feudal system, and paving
the way for collective farms. Ho reluctantly agreed to implement the “land to tiller” program as
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means of pleasing Beijing though he told confidants that he was “in no hurry” to enact the
policy.115 The land reform campaign was launched in 1954. There were complaints of coercion
and brutality, but Ho Chi Minh could only scold his underlings. Violence erupted from the land
reforms as waves of class anger spilled across the country’s peasants. Even those who were loyal
to the Viet Minh’s cause were also accused and executed. Ho Chi Minh repeatedly expressed
opposition to the indiscriminate violence and torture. He stated:
“It [torture] is a savage method used by imperialists, capitalists and feudal
elements to master the masses and the revolution. Why must we, who are in
possession of a just program and a just rationale, make use of such brutal
methods?”116
Ho’s condemnations against brutal techniques went unheard. Fractures were forming
amongst the upper echelons of decision-making as Ho was increasingly seen as too moderate for
the revolutionary cause. According to Duiker, though Ho was displeased with the mass
indiscriminate violence occurring across the countryside, he could not voice his opinions for risk
of offending Beijing during a time in which the Viet Minh desperately needed Beijing’s
unwavering support. William Duiker stated, “Perhaps the most that can be said is that Ho Chi
Minh had become a prisoner of his own creation, a fly in amber, unable in his state of declining
influence to escape the inexorable logic of a system that sacrificed the fate of individuals to the
‘higher mortality’ of the master plan.”117
Despite being the revered Uncle of the nation, Ho’s policies and his desires for peace
through diplomacy in the Vietnam War did not win against Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, two young
hard-liners within the VCP. According to historian Lien-Hang Nguyen’s interview with Hoang
Chinh Minh, a former ideologist for the VCP,
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“Since Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, and a now rehabilitated Truong Chinh had resolved
to adopt violence Maoist revolutionary methods in order to expand the war in the
South, peaceful coexistence became synonymous with revisionism…Le Duan was
the main architect of the resolution, even though nearly half of the Politburo
supported peaceful coexistence. The hardliners silenced the more moderate
Politburo members with threats and blackmail, including sidelining President Ho
Chi Minh at the Ninth Plenum by invoking his past discretions. In fact, Le Duan
presented Ho with the option of ‘following the Politburo line or standing aside’ at
the plenum.”118
At the Ninth Plenum of the VWP Central Committee in 1963, Le Duan capitalized on the
‘theory of two mistakes’ – Ho’s 1945 compromise with the French which led to the French
trying to re-establish colonial rule and the 1954 Geneva Conference which divided the country –
to sideline and shame the aging, moderate leader into accepting the hard-liners’ tactics.119 By this
time, it was clear that Ho no longer had effective decision-making powers over national policies
in the DRV. His role was to unite the people under the cult of Ho while the younger, more
radical party members ran the show.
5.3

The Role of Text in Creating A Personality Cult
As evident from Ho’s prolific writing career before his return to Vietnam in 1941, text

played an important role in creating the personality cult. Historian Olga Dror argued that Ho,
having studied how Stalin created his personality cult, was aware of the influential role of texts
in the creation of the personality cult. 120 The first major book which laid the foundation for
establishing Ho’s cult of personality is Những mẩu chuyện về đời hoạt động của Hồ Chủ Tịch
(Vignettes/Glimpses of President Ho’s Life and Activities), attributed to Tran Dan Tien. 121 Tran
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claimed that he first saw Ho when the leader was proclaiming Vietnamese independence at Ba
Dinh Square in Hanoi in 1945. Ho declined Tran’s request to document the revolutionary
leader’s life, but Tran was able to publish Vignettes from interviewing those who knew of Ho. 122
Vignettes highlighted Ho’s history as a worker, first as a sailor and then as a laborer, while
minimizing his academics-related family background and ties to bourgeois anti-colonialists in
Paris.123 Some historians speculate that Tran Dan Tien was Ho who published an autobiography
under a pseudonym in order to make his name and cause known to the international sphere and
garner support for Vietnamese independence. Olga Dror argued that the existence of innermost
thoughts and personal details in Ho’s early biographies, Vignettes and another early biography,
Biography of President Ho (Tiểu Sử Chủ Tịch Hồ Chí Minh) by Tran Ngoc Danh, implies that
Ho either revealed details in support of the writer or personally penned these books under a
pseudonym.124 Either way, these books were during the 1950s when Ho was at the height of
political power, and neither he nor the party stopped the publications of these books which
heavily contributed to the creation of his cult of personality.
However, Nguyen Khoi, former deputy director of the Secretariat of the National
Assembly, argued that Ho, who just proclaimed independence for his people, was too busy with
the War of Resistance against the French to pen an autobiography. Following the August
Revolution in 1945 by the Viet Minh, Ho issued the Proclamation of Independence of the DRV
and petitioned President Harry S Truman for American support of Vietnamese independence
against France.125 According to Nguyen Khoi, a member of the Party Central Committee and the
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Minister of Propaganda arranged for a written book about Ho so that the party could make Ho’s
name known to the world. Vignettes was translated into French and Chinese and was supposed to
elevate the status of Ho in the eyes of French and Chinese citizens and the Vietnamese
diaspora.126 By the late 1940s, a time when people knew little about the movement for
Vietnamese independence, it was advantageous for the DRV to place Ho on a pedestal as a
charismatic leader fighting for the people rather than a policy or program. On the international
sphere, Ho was to be a charismatic revolutionary who came from a modest background and
sacrificed his life for the independence of his country and his people. Domestically, Ho was to be
revered as the staunch revolutionary hero whose leadership of the Viet Minh defeated the French
and proclaimed independence.
5.4

The Posthumous Cult of Ho Chi Minh
Perhaps the most tragic example of Ho’s inability to wield the power of his cult of

personality is rooted in the events surrounding his death in 1969. The Communist Party
encouraged Ho Chi Minh Thought like that of Mao Zedong Thought in an attempt to further
elevate the status of Ho while maintaining obedience to the state through obedience to Ho Chi
Minh Thought. Ho’s last testament described his wishes to be cremated, his ashes spread across
the beautiful country he fought for, and his bones divided and buried in North, Central, and
South Vietnam so that he may be accessible to all inhabitants of Vietnam. It is customary belief
in Vietnam that a proper burial allows for the spirit to rest at peace. Ironically, the Politburo
denied Ho’s last wishes while urging Vietnamese to study Ho Chi Minh Thought. Le Duan asked
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the Soviet Union to embalm Uncle Ho’s body to protect the physical man who symbolized
national unity and state reverence. 127
The Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, inspired by Lenin’s Mausoleum in Moscow, is one of
Hanoi’s most visited attraction for domestic and foreign tourists.128 Nearby, one can also visit
President Ho’s modest Stilt House, a simple living and workspace located right behind the
grandiose of the Presidential Palace. During the Vietnam War, the DRV was enduring intense
economic hardships because of constant American bombings. Ho’s preference for his smaller,
wooden house compared to the grandeur of the Presidential Palace conveyed to the Vietnamese
people that top officials shared in their suffering but was united and dedicated to the fight for
complete independence. Today, the imagery associated with the Stilt House conveys to tourists
the mythical past of a truly modest, “man of the people.”
Pierre Brocheux, a historian of Vietnam, argued that Ho was imprisoned by the Politburo
which isolated him on a pedestal to be revered while party leaders utilized the cult of Ho to
commit endless cycles of violence. 129 Olga Dror best summarized the main difference between
Ho and other cults of personality.
“Thus, Ho Chi Minh’s cult presents a special case. It was not like Lenin’s cult,
which was rooted in the cult of the Party…It was not like Stalin’s cult, because
Stalin moved to its center while still alive to use it for the sake of his own power.
Ho Chi Minh’s cult trajectory was the opposite – he developed his cult to
mobilize the country to carry out Party and government decisions. Gradually, the
Party took over his cult, keeping Ho Chi Minh as its representation.” 130
Why did Ho gradually lose his power? Perhaps it was due to his reliance on Beijing as
the conflicts in Vietnam escalated which showed his colleagues that he was not and could not be
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an invincible dictator. Perhaps it was age. Similar to Kim Il Sung whose aging health led to a
decline in agency, Ho was experiencing health issues for which he sought treatment in China.
This kept him from being immersed in political discussions and decision-making throughout the
1950s and 1960s. Perhaps Ho truly believed in the idea of collectivized leadership, or most
likely, it was a combination of these factors that eventually led to the manipulation of Ho’s cult
by his party.
After Ho’s death in 1969, Le Duan pushed for collectivized leadership within the VWP
rather than promoting his own cult of personality. Why did Le Duan not push to establish his cult
of personality? One of the underlying motives of routinization of charisma is ensuring security of
one’s position of authority, social prestige, and economic advantages. There was no need for Le
Duan to be the successor to Ho’s personality cult since he already had real political power and
authority in his capacity as First Secretary of the VWP. More importantly, by continuing to
elevate Ho Chi Minh, the party avoids dealing with the problem of succession in what Weber
would call the routinization of charisma. Ho did not have an immediate heir. There is little
known information about his family. He often said that he was married to the country. He was a
man who had devoted his life to the cause of his people or children, a man who sacrificed family
for the independence of his people. His lack of immediate family members allowed Ho to truly
portray the image of the father of the nation.
In 2021, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam continues to manage the cult of Ho for its
pragmatic benefits. After Ho’s death, the party realized it was more difficult for the government
to connect to the people without him. A new generation was going to grow up without seeing and
hearing the charismatic Ho Chi Minh. The party maintains a robust website with curated
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collections of Uncle Ho’s writings, documentaries on his life, and audio recordings of Ho.131 So
long as the party can maintain Ho’s body, never granting him a proper burial and forcing the
spirit of Uncle Ho to wander endlessly, it can be sure of its connection to the people of Vietnam.
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CONCLUSION

The cult of personality literature depicts the charismatic cult leader as an all-power
omniscient deity who can unilaterally dictate national policies. The thesis re-examined the utility
of the cult of personality as a strategic power enhancing tool through a comparative crossnational multi-case study of three Asian leaders – Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh.
The thesis found that as these three Asian leaders’ image became increasingly deified, their
godlike powers, operationalized as unilateral decision-making powers over national policies,
peaked and eventually started declining.
In the case of Kim Il Sung, the leader was a ruthless dictator, implementing constant
party purges to remove party rivals. He was at the height of his political power and had begun
forming a cult of personality when his image was manipulated by close associates, namely his
son Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il manipulated his father’s cult of personality to flatter his father and
steal the seat for succession from his uncle by turning Kim Il Sung, the war hero, into Kim Il
Sung, the omniscient deity, through communication propaganda. As Kim Jong Il became
increasingly engrained in the day-to-day business of the party, Kim Il Sung’s powers over
national policies declined despite his increasingly godlike image. In the case of Mao Zedong,
Mao was able to capitalize on the powers of the cult of personality to a certain extent. He
mobilized the Red Guards to attain political power over the existing party membership, but
ultimately needed military assistance to control the Red Guards’ destructive nature. In the case of
Ho Chi Minh, despite being revered as the nation’s beloved Uncle Ho, he did not have real
decision-making powers over national policies after his perceived two-mistakes. Ho was placed
on a pedestal and his image increasingly revered and deified as his political power over national
policies declined. The political struggles and experiences of the three men challenges the
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theoretical understanding that the object of a cult of personality possesses godlike powers. These
men embodied the deity who reigned but did not rule over his kingdom.
The case studies focused on Asian leaders in nondemocratic, revolutionary regimes;
thereby, limiting the generalizations of the findings to nondemocratic, revolutionary regimes in
Asia. I hope to expand on the thesis in the future by utilizing the established analytical
framework within the existing thesis to examine the utility of the cult of personality in other
regions of the world and in traditionally democratic states. Considering that democratic leaders
have also engendered personality cults, the field of political science’s understanding on the cult
of personality can benefit from a comparative approach to how the cult of personality operates in
nondemocratic versus democratic states. An interesting case study for future research is Donald
Trump’s personality cult in America. What factors of American society allowed for the rise of
Trumpism? How is the cult of Trump different or similar to those of the Kims, Mao, or Ho?
Trump’s incitement of the January 6, 2021 riots at the United States Capitol parallels Mao’s calls
for the Red Gaurds to destroy the “old order.” Yet, resistance against Trump’s policies from
within his administration parallels Ho’s struggles against the CPV during his final years.
I also hope to incorporate more primary resources in future scholarship as archives reopen and more materials become available with increasing temporal distance. There are still
many questions to be explored such as the implications of Khrushchev’s destalinization
campaign on each men’s personality cult and how Vietnam continues to maintain the cult of Ho
with an increasingly cosmopolitan youth. These questions and the main ones I have laid out in
this thesis are a starting point for re-examining and building our understanding of the
multifaceted phenomenon known as the cult of personality.
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